Machine learning, social learning and the governance of self-driving cars by Stilgoe, JEZ
	 1	




Department of Science and Technology Studies, University College London, UK 
 
Abstract 
Self-driving cars, a quintessentially ‘smart’ technology, are not born smart. The 
algorithms that control their movements are learning as the technology emerges. Self-
driving cars represent a high-stakes test of the powers of machine learning, as well as 
a test case for social learning in technology governance. Society is learning about the 
technology while the technology learns about society. Understanding and governing 
the politics of this technology means asking ‘Who is learning, what are they learning 
and how are they learning?’ Focusing on the successes and failures of social learning 
around the much-publicized crash of a Tesla Model S in 2016, I argue that trajectories 
and rhetorics of machine learning in transport pose a substantial governance 
challenge. ‘Self-driving’ or ‘autonomous’ cars are misnamed. As with other 
technologies, they are shaped by assumptions about social needs, solvable problems, 
and economic opportunities. Governing these technologies in the public interest 
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In late 2016, the car company Tesla announced that the new generation of its Model S 
would include ‘full self-driving hardware’ (Tesla, 2016a). This would be a technology 
capable of realizing a long-held dream of automotive autonomy, with the requisite 
sensors and processing power to drive ‘all the way from LA to New York’ without 
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human input by the end of 2017, according to Elon Musk, the company's CEO 
(quoted in Etherington, 2016). However, this quintessentially ‘smart’ technology has 
not been born smart. The brain of this self-driving-car-in-the-making is still not fully 
formed. The algorithms that its creators hope will allow it to soon handle any 
eventuality are being continually updated with new data. It is a car that is learning to 
drive. 
 My curiosity about this particular model has a morbid side. In May 2016, a 
Tesla Model S was involved in what could be considered the world’s first self-driving 
car fatality. In the middle of a sunny afternoon, on a divided highway near Williston, 
Florida, Joshua Brown, an early adopter and Tesla enthusiast, died at the wheel of his 
car. The car failed to see a white truck that was crossing his path. While in ‘Autopilot’ 
mode, Brown’s car hit the trailer at 74 mph (in a 65 mph zone). The crash only came 
to light in late June 2016, when Tesla (2016b) published a blog post, headlined ‘A 
tragic loss’, that described Autopilot as being ‘in a public beta phase’. 
 The self-driving car is a technology that is already with us as well as a work-
in-progress, laden with promise for what it might become. It is an important vehicle 
for the development and application of machine learning. With machine learning, as 
with other emerging technologies, society has not yet worked out the terms of 
responsibility, the distribution of liability, the thresholds of acceptable safety or the 
lines dividing recklessness from negligence. The emergence of self-driving cars is 
therefore also a test of social learning, which can be defined as the way in which 
society and its institutions make sense of novelty. 
 In this article, I analyse the public debate about self-driving car innovation, 
considering competing definitions of problems, solutions and concerns. I begin by 
considering the emerging politics of machine learning and the relative 
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problematization of algorithmic outcomes and processes. I describe how the 
application of deep learning – a mode of artificial intelligence in which software 
learns its own rules to solve tasks – has revived the possibility of self-driving cars, 
making the engineering challenge, as well as social problems from road safety to 
sustainability, appear ‘solvable’. In this light, the terminology of ‘self-driving cars’ 
and ‘autonomous vehicles’ and the promises surrounding these terms appear 
misleading. New companies perform their versions of idealized self-driving futures 
while incumbent car manufacturers work out how to respond, each seeking to redefine 
technological novelty in their interests. When these nascent technologies go wrong, 
the scale of the gap between promise and reality starts to become clear. 
 My examination of the Tesla crash and its aftermath draws on official 
investigations as well as informal online exchanges among users engaged in a process 
of haphazard social learning. An analysis of what was learnt and what was ignored 
after the crash allows for the anticipation of governance challenges ahead. Innovators’ 
insistence that the answer lies in continued autonomy and algorithmic enhancement 
leads to a rejection of new forms of governance and represents a substantial 
privatization of learning. This jeopardizes both public trust and the long-term 
potential of technologies that could be hugely beneficial. Existing governance 
approaches, including the responses from US regulators to the Tesla crash, suggest 
some misguided assumptions, but also some cause for optimism. In my conclusion, I 
point to some governance options that seek to prioritize social learning, focusing in 
particular on the sharing of data.  
 
	 4	
Being ‘in beta’ 
The suggestion that technologies are social experiments has become a commonplace 
critique. If experiments are understood, following Rheinberger (1997), as systems for 
the organized production of surprises, then an approach to technology as a social 
experiment should prompt us to ask what sorts of uncertainties are considered 
pertinent by different actors and how they respond (Gross, 2010; Stilgoe, 2016). In 
other words, we should pay close attention to who learns what and how. 
 Technological accidents can wrest control of the social experiment away from 
the technologists, laying bare the rules and assumptions that shape black boxes and 
exposing the uncertainties that are so easy to ignore when things work well (Wynne, 
1988). Except in cases of total cover-up, accidents can force public reframing and 
institutional reflection.1 
 However, while accidents may be an instructive form of ‘informal technology 
assessment’ (Rip, 1986), the interpretation of their lessons is, as with all learning, 
socially filtered. It is hard to teach institutions things that they do not want to learn. 
The vagaries and blind spots of social learning have been well described by writers in 
the social sciences (see Parson and Clarke, 1995) and elsewhere. As TS Eliot has the 
doomed archbishop Thomas Becket say in ‘Murder in the cathedral’, 
We do not know very much of the future 
Except that from generation to generation 
The same things happen again and again 
Men learn little from others’ experience. 
 
As I describe below, the recognition of such human failings has helped spur efforts to 
rationalize learning in machines. This exacerbates the tendency to blame the things 
that come to be labelled ‘unintended consequences’ (Jasanoff, 2016), on ‘human 
                                                1	While	social	scientists	often	talk	about	technological	‘accidents’,	it	is	worth	noting	that	others,	including	crash	investigators,	shun	the	term	because	it	suggests	that	nobody	is	to	blame.	
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error’ (Shorrock, 2013) or ‘user error’ (Wynne, 1988)). In systems where machines 
and humans interact, users often become the ‘moral crumple zone’ (Elish, 2016) for 
technological failure.  
 Social scientists’ studies of technological accidents point to a more 
constructive alternative view. Reframing errors as ‘system-induced’ (Wiener 1977) 
rather than merely a function of human frailty allows for genuine learning. Perrow 
(1984) emphasizes that humans should be regarded as a resource, not a problem, for 
technological safety. His counterexample to what he regards as inherently dangerous 
nuclear power stations is air travel. Despite the mindboggling socio-technical 
complexity of aeroplanes, Perrow (1984: 127) argues that ‘no other high-risk system 
is so well-positioned to effectively pursue safety as a goal’, because of an emphasis 
on social learning. 
 Innovation is inherently unruly (Wynne, 1988). Rather than just following a 
set of pre-established social rules, such as those to do with safety, technology is a set 
of practices that generate new rules. Questions of safety are therefore hard to pin 
down, because they tend to morph into questions such as ‘safe enough for what?’ 
Discussions that start with ‘risk’ end up being about the purposes of a particular 
technology and its alternatives (Rayner and Cantor, 1987). 
 Work in science and technology studies (STS) has gone some way towards 
explaining the social constitution of technologies such as nuclear power, genetically 
modified foods, nanotechnology and geoengineering (Kearnes et al. 2006; 
Szerszynski et al. 2013; Winner 1980). But there has been less attention to the 
dynamics through which such constitutions emerge and alternative modes of 
governance might suggest improvements. Rather than seeing technologies as 
constitutionally static, we can instead imagine them as processes of learning. 
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 There are multiple ways in which social learning is relevant to the governance 
of emerging technologies. The first, originating in educational psychology (e.g., 
Bandura, 1988), starts from the observation that people can and do learn in groups – 
with and from others. This literature sees social learning as the product of interactions 
between the cognitive activities of learners, the social behaviours they see modelled 
and the wider environment. The normative possibilities of social learning lie in 
understanding the multidimensionality of issues and experimenting with new 
approaches to achieve social change (e.g., Friedman and Abonyi, 1976; Reed et al., 
2010). Systems that are good at social learning are seen as more resilient, interpreting 
shocks and crises as opportunities (Berkes and Turner, 2006). The substantial 
literature on social learning for sustainability blends two approaches to social 
learning: the first focussing on how people learn socially, the second asking how 
societies learn (Parson and Clark, 1995). 
 Theories of social learning in governance emphasize the design of systems and 
institutions that learn and improve over time (Fischer, 2000; Rayner, 2004; Wynne, 
1992). These frameworks have an analytical basis in theories of politics as a form of 
learning (Hall, 1993), with policymaking seen not just as the playing out of 
stakeholder interests, but as ‘puzzling together’ (Hoppe, 2011), in the tradition of 
Dewey (1916).  
 The conception of governance as social learning is particularly pertinent to 
new technologies, which typically emerge in what Hajer (2003) calls an ‘institutional 
void’, surrounded by uncertainties not just about the effects of technology 
(Collingridge, 1980) but also the object of governance itself (Owen, 2014). 
Conventional technology assessment fixates on the products of innovation, and in 
particular its hazards. Frameworks of responsible innovation aim to also engage 
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upstream with the processes and purposes of innovation, recognizing that, in addition 
to questions of risk, public concerns also relate to how and why innovation happens 
(Stilgoe et al., 2013). Recent efforts to expand practices of public deliberation on new 
technologies can be seen as a form of learning with and about the social context of 
new technologies, with the additional aim of galvanizing collective action (Fischer, 
2000; Webler et al., 1995). 
 Many of the most profound limits to responsiveness in innovation relate to 
inadequacies in social learning. The historians’ lament that those ignorant of history 
are doomed to repeat it is particularly apposite because innovation is imagined as a 
project of novelty. As Rayner (2004) has argued, presumptions of novelty act against 
learning. It becomes easy for innovators to argue that ‘this time it’s different’ and that 
past pathologies of technological development, such as widening inequality, ethical 
dilemmas, unjustified hype, novel risks and other unintended consequences will not 
be repeated. Institutions often lack the reflexive capacity to take on board and respond 
either to the views of others (Wynne, 1993) or to early warnings of danger (EEA, 
2001). It is easier for institutions to imagine deficits of public knowledge, public trust 
or regulation (Rayner, 2004) than to question the uncertainties and contingencies of 
their own commitments. At the heart of Paquet’s (2005, p. 315) critique of 
‘solutionism’, in which issues are ‘interpreted as puzzles to which there is a solution 
rather than problems to which there may be a response’, is a concern that ‘[t]here is 
no place for social learning… the development of rough and ready arrangements 
around which collaboration and negotiations might be built’. 
 Given the uncertainties of innovation and an institutionalized tendency 
towards hubris (Jasanoff, 2004), a focus on social learning offers a way to understand 
and democratize the means and ends of the social experiment of technological change. 
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Both senses of social learning – how people learn socially and how societies learn – 
apply. The latter is more obviously relevant to the governance of new technologies. 
But the former becomes particularly interesting when we consider the ‘social’ within 
machine learning.  
 
The sociology of machine learning 
The recent and rapid resurgence of machine learning poses particular challenges for 
governance based on social learning. Machine learning systems such as those in 
control of nascent self-driving cars offer a literal example of Wynne’s (1988) 
characterization of technology as rule-making as well as rule-following behaviour. 
The algorithmic architecture of self-driving car programming begins with ‘if-then-
else’ rules, which define actions under certain conditions. The car senses and 
classifies the world around it before probabilistically making choices based upon what 
it has learnt.  
 However, driving is too complicated to fit a predict-and-provide approach. As 
engineers have come to recognize the breadth of possible situations that might need to 
be defined by formal rules and then engraved in algorithms, they have turned to 
machine learning using deep neural networks. Here, the aim of the game is to work 
out the rules. The machine is trained by extracting patterns from vast datasets, a 
process referred to as ‘rule learning’, ‘rule induction’ or ‘rule extraction’. For 
engineers, the gains in efficiency are clear. Lipson and Kurman (2016: 8) claim: ‘The 
fact that deep-learning software ‘learns’ by looking at the world gives it [a] major 
advantage: it’s not rule bound.’ Sebastian Thrun, formerly Google’s self-driving car 
lead, goes further, arguing that ‘[t]he data can make better rules’ (Vanderbilt, 2012). 
One engineering analysis (Moore and Lu, 2011) argues that the rules written by 
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machines from available data would be less arbitrary than the legal ‘rules of the road’ 
(see also Both, 2016). 
 For governance, this unruliness is a cause for concern. The tension between 
rule-following and rule-making in machine learning has started to be explored by 
literature on the politics of algorithms (Burrell, 2016). As it has become clear that 
citizens’ lives are increasingly shaped and cajoled by the influence of algorithms and 
artificial intelligence, social scientists, legal scholars and philosophers have developed 
critical approaches (Mittelstadt et al., 2016). Many of these focus on the question of 
opacity. Algorithms are ‘black boxes’ (Pasquale, 2015) but, unlike many others, they 
may be extremely hard, if not impossible, to prise open with sociological or historical 
tools.  
 Burrell (2016) sees three modes of algorithmic impenetrability. First, 
algorithms are a source of competitive advantage and therefore likely to be 
proprietary. For this reason, access to code and the data that enables its learning will, 
according to Pasquale (2015), become a growing point of contention between 
companies and others seeking to understand their actions. Secondly, as algorithms 
become more specialized, more complex and composed by multiple authors with 
different perspectives, even their creators may no longer be able to understand them 
(Burell, 2016). As computer entrepreneur-turned-academic Kevin Slavin puts it: 
‘We’re writing things we can no longer read’ (quoted in Neyland, 2016). For those on 
the outside seeking to hold algorithms to account, the challenge of legibility is even 
greater. The third way in which algorithms become obscure is in their application, 
creating complexity as they make use of large datasets. Understanding and dealing 
with this means going beyond conventional calls for algorithmic transparency to 
scrutinize real-world uses (Annany and Crawford, 2016; Burell, 2016).  
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 Those seeking to govern algorithms have much to learn from past examples of 
emerging technologies. Over the past three decades, a fault line has emerged in the 
debate over agricultural biotechnology regulation. One approach, favoured by US 
regulators, seeks to evaluate an innovation’s products – traits, risks, benefits and other 
outcomes. The assumption is that technologies, like sausages and laws, should be 
judged on the quality of the product, not the process that created it. The other 
approach, more common in Europe, focuses on the novelty of the process (Jasanoff, 
1995; Kuzma, 2016). Those advocating a more precautionary approach to regulation 
have argued that a product-based approach, by emphasizing the ‘substantial 
equivalence’ between an innovation and its predecessors, overlooks uncertainties that 
may emerge as problematic (Millstone et al., 1999). The presumption of substantial 
equivalence is also likely to generate controversies about labelling when groups 
disagree about the nature and implications of technological novelty.  
 For machine learning, there are process considerations relating to the often-
opaque generation of outcomes by digital systems, as well as to the processes through 
which new technologies are created, such as the gathering of data and the assumptions 
made within algorithms. The identification of tasks and modes of machine learning 
(for example, reinforcement learning, which adopts a trial, error and reward approach 
to optimization, described in one leading paper (Mnih et al., 2015) as ‘deeply rooted 
in psychological and neuroscientific perspectives on animal behaviour’) is 
inescapably social.  
 Deep learning systems are seen by their creators as means of engaging with an 
uncertain world that is impossible to capture with a set of formal rules. However, in 
developing rules, such systems may create new social uncertainties. In gaining the 
ability to recognize and make decisions about unfamiliar information, they lose the 
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ability to account for their actions. Algorithmic outcomes may therefore be 
inscrutable, their decisions being the computing equivalent of a hunch. The what is 
prioritized over the why or the how. This has led some to call for a ‘right to 
explanation’ (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016) in cases where the ‘production of 
prediction’ (Mackenzie, 2015) has profound consequences for people’s lives.1 For the 
machine learning community, the challenge is seen as one of ‘interpretability’ 
(Vellido et al., 2012). For governance, an additional question is whether standards of 
interpretability might differ between companies, regulators, users, and citizens 
(Edwards and Veale, 2017). An explanation that is considered adequate by engineers 
may not satisfy a sceptical NGO, for example. And, if datasets are large and 
multidimensional, simple explanations may be impossible. The separation of 
outcomes from processes if interpretability is trumped by efficiency forms a 
substantial barrier to social learning.  
 The politics of interpretability have already revealed themselves with the type 
of image recognition techniques at work in self-driving car systems. When Google’s 
algorithms were misidentifying images of people as dogs and, with predictably 
greater controversy, black people as gorillas, the company’s own engineers could not 
pinpoint where the problem lay (Annany and Crawford, 2016). The machines were 
learning in ways that their creators could not understand. Innovators express the 
surprise they feel when they see one of their creations learning something for itself. 
One Netflix executive described the insights generated by their algorithms being like 
a ‘ghost in the machine’ (Finn, 2017). After years of unsupervised machine learning, 
researchers are only now beginning to understand how a deep neural network goes 
about identifying an image (Lipson and Kurman, 2016; Nvidia, 2017).  
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 One early governance concern with self-driving cars has related to the ethics 
of algorithms making life or death decisions in the event of crashes and the 
responsibilities that this might place upon designers and manufacturers (Bonnefon et 
al., 2016; Crawford and Calo, 2016). Deep learning could outsource such decisions to 
the machine and make it impossible to account for them. As such, it could become a 
form of codified irresponsibility, a convenient way for companies to avoid both 
liability and learning.  
 For robust governance, systems need to be understood and scrutinized in 
multiple ways from multiple perspectives (Annany and Crawford, 2016). Allowing 
learning to be defined with reference only to a particular algorithm’s task restricts the 
potential for contestation according to different purposes. The imagined purposes of 
technologies and their justification are tightly linked with the definition of particular 
problems (Morozov, 2013). As an optimizing strategy, machine learning demands the 
tight identification of tasks. Problems need to be well defined such that they can be 
‘solved’ and the efficiency of the solution evaluated. For cars, this means considering 
how what engineers call the ‘driving task’ has been articulated, cut into various sub-
tasks and reconstructed as ‘solvable’. 
 
Self-driving as a ‘solvable problem’ 
Much of the early history of automated cars, downplayed in more recent rhetoric, 
involved plans for the integrated innovation of vehicles and highways. From the 
1950s up to the end of the century, it was assumed that, in order to get self-driving 
cars to work, they would need to communicate with similarly intelligent highways 
(Wetmore, 2003).2 
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 At the same time, car manufacturers were adding automated systems such as 
cruise control and airbags to improve safety and comfort (Vinsel, forthcoming). 
Adaptive cruise control, lane-departure warnings, collision warnings, rear view 
cameras and other aids came to be classified as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems. 
Tesla’s Autopilot, installed in almost 100,000 cars as of January 2017, might be seen 
as a straightforward next step. However, a narrative of incrementalism would 
overlook the role of machine learning, which is seen by self-driving enthusiasts as the 
tool that will upend conventional transport. 
 Newer companies with self-driving car investments such as Tesla, Google, 
Delphi, Nvidia, Mobileye, Nutonomy, Otto and Cruise Automation, most of whom 
have emerged from the vicinity of Silicon Valley, would trace the histories of their 
transport work back to the ‘Grand Challenge’ robot driving competitions staged by 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). At the first event, in the 
Mojave Desert in 2004, the best of the cars managed only 7 miles of the 150-mile 
course. The next year, five vehicles completed the course. The 2007 version was 
staged in an urban environment. The six cars that finished were seen as an 
announcement to the world that innovation was happening apace. The 2005 and 2007 
events brought attention to engineers from Stanford and Carnegie Mellon universities, 
who would go on to populate some of the leading private-sector self-driving car 
teams.  
 The advancing robotics revealed by the DARPA challenge benefitted from 
and spurred on advances in computing. Hardware originally designed for videogame 
graphics was found to be extremely good at the rapid parallel processing required for 
machine learning. From 2008 onwards, these Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) 
enabled dramatic improvements in complex computer models known as deep neural 
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networks. As of 2016, these neural networks’ greatest feats have been in digital image 
recognition, where it is claimed their abilities have surpassed humans’ (Krizhevsky et 
al., 2012), and voice recognition (Lecun et al., 2015). Training these networks became 
possible with the accumulation of massive, labelled datasets. For self-driving cars, the 
gathering of data from both mapping projects and real-world driving has become 
central to the development of vehicles’ processing capabilities.  
 Autonomous driving is now imagined as possible despite the unpredictability 
of the open road. Innovators insist that self-driving cars are now a ‘solvable problem’ 
that, according to Musk, speaking in 2015, is ‘almost … a solved problem. We know 
exactly what to do and we will be there in a few years’ (quoted in Scoltock, 2015). 
The CEO of Nvidia, a pioneer of GPUs for machine learning and a Tesla hardware 
partner, told a Consumer Electronics Show audience that ‘We can realize this vision 
[of self-driving cars] right now’. On the screen behind him were the words ‘AI 
[artificial intelligence] is the solution to self-driving’ (Recode, 2017). 
The gamification of driving 
The reduction of the driving task to a solvable machine learning problem follows a set 
of high-profile achievements in artificial intelligence. AI has long held a maxim 
known as the Moravec paradox, in honour of the robotics pioneer Hans Moravec: 
‘[T]he hard problems are easy and the easy problems are hard’ (Pinker, 1995: 192). 
For early AI, things that humans could do without thinking, such as walking, seemed 
almost impossible to emulate, while cognitively hard tasks like chess proved 
remarkably easy for computers.  
Driving does not require a genius. Indeed, proponents of self-driving cars are 
fond of pointing out the intellectual deficits of human drivers. The quest is therefore 
to tear apart Moravec’s paradox, to turn a task that many humans find easy into one 
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that computers can solve, with enough data and processing power. In this way, 
driving has been turned into a form of machine learning game.  
 Rather than attempting to replicate the thought processes of human drivers, the 
approach has been one of brute force, with the key resource being data. With the turn 
to ‘big data’, machine learning has seen what Lipson and Kurman call ‘the transition 
from data-poor “clever” algorithms to data-rich “simple” ones’ (Lipson and Kurman, 
2015: 219). The complexity of driving data is far greater than in chess, but the sources 
of learning – billions of hours of real and simulated driving – are greater too. As I 
explain below, self-driving cars learn as fleets rather than as individual robots.  
 One attempt (though flawed (Borup et al., 2006)) to capture and challenge the 
levels of promise surrounding emerging technologies has been developed by Gartner, 
a consultancy firm. Their 2015 ‘hype cycle’ had autonomous vehicles (AVs) at its 
apex, on the cusp of the ‘trough of disillusionment’. AVs were, according to Gartner, 
5-10 years away. The 2016 version had AVs beginning their slide towards reality, and 
now being more than ten years away. A cynic might highlight the contradiction: that 
the technology’s arrival is getting ever more distant. Wetmore (2003) points out that 
self-driving vehicles were ‘only 20 years away’ for more than 60 years in the 20th 
Century. But the more important concern is that there is no clear, uncontested line 
demarcating the presence of a technology in society. Chris Urmson, then leader of 
Google’s self-driving car project, said in March 2016: 
How quickly can we get this into people’s hands? If you read the papers, you 
see maybe it’s three years, maybe it’s thirty years. And I am here to tell you 
that honestly, it’s a bit of both. (in Gomes, 2016).  
 
Companies with commitments to self-driving cars and investment horizons of only a 
few years have little choice but to exaggerate the speed and downplay the friction of 
technological change. They must navigate what Rayner (2004) calls the ‘novelty 
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trap’, advertising a technology as ground-breaking and transformative while seeking 
to persuade regulators that it is no more than an incremental step beyond existing 
approaches. The perfect self-driving futures currently on offer are further away than 
their proponents imagine. And yet, in the formal and informal experiments currently 
underway, self-driving cars can be said to be on the streets already. With Musk’s 
encouragement, Tesla owners and journalists have described Autopilot’s benefits as 
vast (Musk, 2016a; xkwizit, 2016; xrayvsn, 2016). One technology reporter wrote that 
Tesla’s ‘self-steering was suddenly, overnight, via a software update, a giant leap 
toward full autonomy’ (Bradley, 2016).	At the same time, the company’s response to 
regulatory scrutiny is to suggest that their innovations are mere ‘baby steps’ (Frankel, 
2016). The rhetorical management of the definition of increments and revolutions in 
innovation is a central project of contemporary innovation (Borup et al., 2006). The 
gap between baby steps and giant leaps, between concept cars and transport systems, 
is filled with promise and speculation.	
 The global unevenness of road surfaces, built environments, other road users, 
weather conditions, regulatory regimes and driving cultures means that self-driving 
cars can, without paradox, be both complicated and straightforward, implausible and 
probable, distant and just-around-the-corner. The development of artificial 
intelligence is not a line from easy to hard. If machine learning is ‘the part of artificial 
intelligence that actually works’ (Kosner, 2013), we must question the contexts in 
which it can be said to ‘work’.3 Despite the existence of a car with ‘[f]ull self-driving 
hardware’ (Tesla, 2016a), it may still be impossibly hard to chart a route through the 
messy transitions, mixtures and missteps that may be encountered en route to a self-
driving world.  
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 In addition to systems such as Tesla’s Autopilot, the public performance of 
inevitability has taken the form of a number of high-profile tests. Unlike the DARPA 
challenges, which were genuine public experiments, subsequent efforts had closer 
control of their uncertainties (see Collins, 1988). In his testimony to a US Senate 
Committee, Glen de Vos (2016) from Delphi described how, 
‘in April of 2015, Delphi completed the first automated vehicle cross-country 
drive … a 15-state, 3,400-mile journey from San Francisco to New York City 
with a car that, 99 per cent of the time, was driving without human input.’4 
 
Google claimed to have achieved ‘the world’s first truly self-driving ride on public 
roads at the end of 2015’ (Dolgov, 2017). Other companies have released videos that 
show off their cars’ autonomy, navigating a city’s streets and finding parking spaces 
while the human in the driving seat merely watches.  
 Even if a car manages to drive itself 99% of the time, there is reason to treat 
the final 1% with extreme caution. Journalists and public observers have leapt upon a 
series of very public bumps and scrapes as self-driving cars have started to be tested 
in cities (Muoio, 2016; Reynolds, 2016). Such uncontrolled encounters are more 
publicly useful than any number of advertisements of perfection, which, as roboticists 
have pointed out, are ‘doomed to succeed’ (Brooks and Mataric, 1993).  
 Tesla has claimed that, even without self-driving, their cars are generating data 
that will persuade regulators of their increased safety. But regulators legitimately 
focus on the uncertainties of technological performance. A technology that works 
well right up to the point that it doesn’t, particularly when that point demands the 
attention of a user who has lost concentration, represents a substantial regulatory 
problem. By the time a technology switches off, its user has probably also switched 
off. As one Toyota engineer has argued ‘none of us in the automobile or IT industries 
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are close to achieving true … autonomy …. In some ways, the worst case is a car that 
will need driver intervention once every 200,000 miles’ (Toyota USA, 2017). 
 For self-driving car engineers, this issue is imagined as the ‘handoff problem’, 
a feature of human-computer interaction well known to ergonomists that is now being 
relearnt. An effect of autopilots on aeroplanes is that they can reduce a pilot’s 
capacity to take control when the situation demands, either because of a long-term 
atrophying of skills through lack of practice or a short-term disorientation through 
lack of attention. Long periods of autonomy fundamentally change the role of the 
human from operator (‘in the loop’) to supervisor (‘on the loop’) (Cummings and 
Thornburg, 2011; Perrow, 1984). Studies of simulated handoffs in cars, when 
automated systems demand engagement from distracted humans, suggest that it can 
take as long as 40 seconds for humans to regain full control of a car (Morgan et al., 
2016). 
 In the real world, humans may be unaware of technological failure happening. 
In some recorded cases with Tesla’s Autopilot, the explanation for a malfunction has 
been clear, such as when a large moth blocked a Model S’s radar sensor on a highway 
(Redebo, 2016). In other cases, however, bemused and trusting users have been 
unable to explain why Autopilot didn't work as they had expected. Many of these 
glitches have proven inconsequential. However, they have pointed to a gap between 
the promise and the reality of a technology that is failing to live up to its name.  
 
‘Autonomous vehicles’ and ‘self-driving cars’ as misnomers 
The terms ‘self-driving cars’, ‘autonomous vehicles’ and ‘driverless cars’ have been 
used almost interchangeably in public discourse (Cohen et al., 2017). The differences 
in nuance implied by these terms should not distract us from a larger concern, which 
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is with the rhetoric of autonomous technology. Technology, however, is never self-
driving (Bijker et al., 1987; Winner, 1977). Claims that technology has a will of its 
own (e.g. Kelly, 2010), typically disguise a political agenda that is libertarian and 
deregulatory.  
 Just as self-driving cars cannot be self-driven, so autonomous vehicles can 
never be truly autonomous (Stayton, 2015). Self-driving cars are driven by social 
processes of goal-selection, machine-making, governance, use and their encounters 
with the world around them. The word ‘autonomous’ belies not just the human 
involvement in the cars’ creation, but also the connectivity that enables their 
operation. As Bradshaw and colleagues (2013) point out, ‘autonomous system’ is a 
misnomer, if not an oxymoron. ‘Autonomy’ only happens when tasks and real-world 
contexts are sufficiently constrained (Bradshaw et al., 2013). ‘Autonomous vehicles’ 
are not self-contained, they are not self-sufficient and they are not self-taught. Unlike 
a conventional car, a self-driving car can function only as part of a fleet. Tesla’s cars 
are bought as individual objects, but commit their owners to sharing data with the 
company in a process called ‘fleet learning’. ‘The whole Tesla fleet operates as a 
network. When one car learns something, they all learn it’, with each Autopilot user 
as an ‘expert trainer for how the autopilot should work’ (Musk, quoted in 
Fehrenbacher, 2015). Together, these users generate millions of miles of data every 
day (Musk, 2016b). Each car’s neural network learns how to drive not just from its 
own experience, but also from the accumulated experience of its thousands of sister 
vehicles.  
‘Whenever a self-driving car makes a mistake, automatically all the other cars 
know about it, including future unborn cars … The ability of cars to develop 
artificial intelligence is so much greater than the ability of people to keep up 
with them’ (Thrun, quoted in Lane, 2016). 
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For engineers, fleet learning has the dual advantage of massively increasing the speed 
with which cars can understand the world, while avoiding the imperfections of human 
learning that are captured in archbishop Becket’s lament. Indeed, some researchers 
have sought to escape the constraint of real-world trial-and-error. Reinforcement 
learning in simulated environments, including games such as Grand Theft Auto, is 
seen as one way of accelerating self-driving car training (Filipowicz et al., 2017; You 
et al., 2017).  
 For some companies, the interconnectedness of self-driving cars is central to 
the business model. While Tesla owners have been experimenting with self-driving 
largely on open highways, ride-sharing taxi companies such as Uber and Lyft have 
been early investors and experimenters in urban self-driving. In such environments, 
the efficiency gains from vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure 
communication become clearer and the tension between interdependence and 
autonomy becomes more visible (Yoshida, 2017). The benefits of autonomous 
vehicles may therefore be inversely proportional to their autonomy from one another. 
In this respect, the stimulus of DARPA may have set self-driving in a counter-
productive direction given that the needs of military vehicles, operating in 
unstructured environments, are very different from conventional ones, which are, in 
most places, embedded in well-organized highway systems (Schladover, 2009). 
 Technologies are imagined as solutions to particular problems, and we can 
examine the construction of those problems in order to interrogate the explicit and 
implicit purposes of the technology. But technologies also create problems of their 
own. As Latour and Venn (2002) have discussed, technologies are not merely means 
to ends, a way of getting from A to B. They are detours, taking us to futures that may 
be unintended and are impossible to fully calculate in advance. The ends enabled by 
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technological innovation are typically hard to anticipate and hard to challenge, in part 
because of innovators’ lack of reflexivity about uncertainties and contingencies 
(Guston, 2014). Accidents therefore provide a constructive opportunity for reframing.  
 
Responding to the first self-driving death 
On 30 June 2016, Tesla published a blog post announcing and responding to the crash 
that had happened six weeks earlier. After explaining that the circumstances of this 
tragedy were exceptional, following a pattern familiar from previous technological 
failures (Wynne, 1988), the company’s response went on to explain that Autopilot 
was still a technology ‘in beta’ and that responsibility for safe driving remained the 
driver’s alone. Musk later told reporters, 
Perfect safety is really an impossible goal. It’s really about improving the 
probability of safety – that’s the only thing possible (quoted in Lambert, 
2016). 
 
Musk’s responses represent an attempt at renegotiating the contract between 
carmakers, drivers and the market. Conventional carmakers have largely been limited 
to innovating and testing in private before releasing their products into the wild. 
Crash-testing, for example, has been a vital part of automotive innovation, but it has 
been imagined as a private activity, conducted in laboratories or computer simulations 
(Leonardi, 2010). A production car typically needs to be crashed more than twenty 
times in tests in order to satisfy regulators. During the early life of the Tesla Model S, 
the company emphasized that the hardware was world-beating. As well as 
acceleration that beat most petrol-driven cars, the company trumpeted ‘the best safety 
rating of any car ever tested’ (Tesla, 2013). Nevertheless, the Tesla is not sold as a 
finished article. It is seen as a technology capable of development, a framework for 
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the accommodation of software that can be continually upgraded. The company 
argued that, with existing hardware, their software target was a 90% reduction in 
crashes by using Autopilot (Musk, 2017a). The May 2016 crash and the response 
therefore represented a public trial less of the car’s body than its brain.  
 The first official report of the May 2016 crash, from the Florida police, put the 
blame squarely on the truck driver for failing to yield the right of way (Traffic Crash 
Records, 2016). However, the circumstances of the crash were seen as sufficiently 
novel to warrant investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
as well as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The NTSB 
is tasked with identifying the probable cause of every air accident in the US, as well 
as some highway crashes. However, the novelties of the Tesla collision limited the 
Board’s ability to report quickly on events. Their preliminary report was matter-of-
fact. It relates that, at 4:40pm on a clear, dry day, a large truck carrying blueberries 
crossed US Highway 27A in front of the Tesla, which failed to stop. The Tesla passed 
under the truck, sheering off the car’s roof. The collision cut power to the wheels and 
the car then coasted off the road for 297 feet before hitting and breaking a pole, 
turning sideways and coming to a stop. Brown was pronounced dead at the scene. The 
truck was barely damaged. 
 The NTSB (2016) noted that the Tesla Model S is a fervent data generator. 
The car’s records revealed that the car was travelling at 74 mph when it hit the truck, 
9 mph above the speed limit. The car was also able to tell the NTSB that Autopilot 
was active at the time of the crash.  
 In May 2017, the NTSB released its full docket of reports on the crash. From 
further data released by Tesla, the investigators learnt that Joshua Brown’s 40-minute 
journey consisted of two-and-a-half minutes of conventional driving followed by 37 
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and a half minutes on Autopilot, during which his hands were off the steering wheel 
for 37 minutes (NTSB, 2017a). He touched the wheel eight times in response to 
warnings from the car. The longest time between touches was six minutes. In the 
minutes before the crash, neither Brown nor Autopilot ever applied the brakes. The 
NTSB calculated that Brown would have had at least ten seconds to react had he seen 
the truck. The only witness to speak to the NTSB said that the crash looked like,  
A white cloud, like just a big white explosion … and the car came out from under 
that trailer and it was bouncing … I didn’t even know … it was a Tesla until the 
highway patrol lady interviewed me two weeks later …. She said it’s a Tesla and 
it has Autopilot, and I didn’t know they had that in those cars. (NTSB, 2017b) 
 
This window into the functioning of a car that its owner regarded as capable of self-
driving is important, but it remains misty. The car is replete with sensors, but these 
offer no insight into what the car thought it saw nor how it reached its decisions. The 
car’s brain remained largely off-limits to investigators. At a board meeting in 
September 2017, one NTSB staff member explained: ‘The data we obtained was 
sufficient to let us know the [detection of the truck] did not occur, but it was not 
sufficient to let us know why’ (NTSB, 2017c). 
 The NHTSA saw the incident as an opportunity for a crash course in self-
driving car innovation. Its Office of Defects Investigation wrote to Tesla demanding 
data on all of their cars, instances of Autopilot use and abuse, customer complaints, 
legal claims, a log of all technology testing and modification in the development of 
Autopilot and a full engineering specification of how and why Autopilot does what it 
does (NHTSA, 2016a). 
 While working with the ongoing NTSB and NHTSA investigations, Tesla 




‘Do the math’ 
The day after Tesla revealed the crash, car safety veteran Clarence Ditlow was quoted 
as saying that, ‘The Tesla vehicles with autopilots are vehicles waiting for a crash to 
happen – and it did in Florida’ (quoted in Puzzanghera, 2016). Ditlow said that the 
Autopilot feature should be disabled until regulators were able to advise on its limits. 
His criticism related not just to whether Autopilot worked as a driving aid, but also 
whether it was luring drivers into complacency by implicitly over-claiming.  
 The German transport minister asked Tesla to rename the system, to which the 
company responded, ‘Autopilot is a suite of technologies that operate in conjunction 
with the human driver to make driving safer and less stressful’ and published the 
results of a survey that suggested 98% of German drivers were aware of the limits of 
the system (Bild, 2016). For some regulators, including in California, (State of 
California Department of Motor Vehicles, 2016), the name, and the claims 
surrounding it, implied that the system was not an automatic pilot, for driver-
assistance, but an autonomous pilot, to replace a driver. Tesla’s competitors shared 
the concern. Machine learning pioneer Andrew Ng, just after leaving Google to join 
Baidu, tweeted, in reference to an earlier, non-fatal crash: 
It's irresponsible to ship driving system that works 1,000 times and lulls false 
sense of safety, then... BAM! (Ng, 2016). 
 
Trent Victor, an engineer at Volvo, who call their system ‘Pilot Assist’, told a 
technology reporter that ‘[Autopilot] gives you the impression that it’s doing more 
than it is … [it] is more of an unsupervised wannabe’ (quoted in Golson, 2016). David 
Caldwell from Cadillac had justified the delay of a new feature called ‘Super Cruise’ 
in terms of corporate responsibility: ‘We won’t release it just to hit a date, nor will we 
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“beta test” with customers’ (quoted in Davies, 2016). And one driving journalist 
pointed out that, while Mercedes’ ‘Drive Pilot’ was technically equivalent to Tesla’s 
Autopilot, the German company had deliberately limited the system in order to avoid 
users thinking they were in a self-driving car (Jaynes, 2016). Tesla, by making 
promises about imminent autonomy, seemed to be caught, along with their users, in a 
web of hyperbole. 
 Other critics suggested that Tesla’s real irresponsibility lay in their failure to 
reveal the crash at the time of a public stock offering that raised $1.46 billion. Alan 
Murray, the editor of Fortune magazine, claimed that the crash was a material fact for 
the share price, to which Musk responded, 
Indeed, if anyone bothered to do the math (obviously, you did not) they would 
realize that of the over 1M auto deaths per year worldwide, approximately half a 
million people would have been saved if the Tesla autopilot was universally 
available. Please, take 5 mins and do the bloody math before you write an article 
that misleads the public. (quoted in Loomis, 2016). 
 
In this exchange, Musk’s framing is one of near-perfect consequentialism. He 
imagines the issue as one of relative risk: the acceptability of self-driving cars should 
be determined merely in comparison to the safety of conventional, human-driven cars. 
He is attempting to restrict the debate to technological outcomes rather than processes 
or purposes. In legitimizing only the probabilistic risk quantity, he is ignoring 
concerns about risk quality, such as those revealed through social science relating to 
control, trust, fairness, catastrophic potential, novelty and uncertainty (Irwin et al., 
1999; Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1998). Societies may know that air travel is far safer than 
car travel and still justifiably take issue with aeroplane crashes, for example. A system 
in which conventional cars are replaced by self-driving cars may see the decline of 
conventional accidents, but the arrival of new categories of catastrophe relating to 
‘mode confusion’ (NHTSA, 2014, RAND, 2016) or software vulnerabilities. If 
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regulators merely ‘do the math’, they should be relatively relaxed about occasional 
technological failure and exceptional circumstances, as long as the aggregate 
performance improves upon alternatives. Musk’s insistence upon ‘doing the math’ led 
him to a further rebuttal of journalists’ criticisms: 	
If, in writing some article that’s negative, you ... dissuade people from using 
an autonomous vehicle, you're killing people (quoted in McGoogan, 2016). 
 
Musk’s competitors do not share his certainty. Most would admit that they are a long 
way away from safe self-driving cars. Gill Pratt from Toyota has claimed that 
reasonable reassurance about safety would only come after a trillion miles of testing 
(Guizzo and Ackerman, 2015; also, Kalra and Paddock, 2016). Given that this scale 
of advance testing is impossible, as it was when Alvin Weinberg (1972) made a 
similar point about nuclear power stations, the uncertainties, and therefore the politics 
of experimentation, will never be settled.  
 
Constructing human deficiency 
In January 2017, the NHTSA issued its report on the May 2016 Tesla crash. The 
agency’s initial aim was to ‘examine the design and performance of any automated 
driving systems in use at the time of the crash’. The conventional outcome of such 
investigations is a decision on the necessity of a product recall. In this case, however, 
the NHTSA noted how the system under evaluation had already changed markedly 
since the crash through wireless software updates. 
 The report contained two largely separate assessments. The first took an 
engineering approach, sidestepping the connections with grander visions of full 
autonomy. The report emphasized that the Tesla Autopilot was a long way from full 
autonomy. NTHSA broke down Autopilot into its constituent systems: lane centering 
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control, automatic emergency braking (AEB) and traffic-aware cruise control. This 
choice to evaluate the technology as a set of merely incremental innovations 
highlighted some important specifics while overlooking larger questions. The report 
notes, for example, that AEB is designed for rear-end collisions:  
Braking for crossing path collisions, such as that present in the Florida fatal 
crash, are outside the expected performance capabilities of the system 
(NHTSA, 2017).  
 
The second strand of analysis focussed on what the NHTSA called ‘human factors’. 
Their approach was one of ‘naïve sociology’ (Wynne, 1989), in which technologies, 
when assessed, are assumed to operate within a world far tidier and more predicable 
than reality. The criticisms of Tesla amounted to a suggestion that the company’s 
warning information was ‘perhaps not as specific as it could be’. The agency notes 
that advanced driver assistance systems are correlated with increased instances of 
distractions greater than seven seconds. This is a well-known feature of automated 
systems, bolstered by research in self-driving car simulators (Körber et al., 2015), in 
which the ‘vigilance decrement’ of humans becomes more problematic as automation 
improves. Nevertheless, the NHTSA were satisfied by Tesla’s own research into 
‘mode confusion’ and chose to direct their major recommendation at users: ‘Drivers 
should read all instructions and warnings provided in owner’s manuals for ADAS 
[advanced driver-assistance systems] technologies and be aware of system 
limitations’ (NHTSA, 2017). The NHTSA missed an opportunity for social learning 
and wider applicability with its assessment. Had, for example, a pedestrian or the 
driver of another car been killed in the crash, the agency’s framing and subsequent 
assessment may have been very different (Faife, 2017). 
 The identification and blaming of human deficits has been a common feature 
of self-driving car innovation. Much of the early justification for autonomous cars 
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made reference to the more than 90% of car accidents caused by human error 
(NHTSA, 2017). As people started to encounter Google’s test vehicles, reports of 
low-speed crashes caused by bemused or star-struck humans were common. Google’s 
self-driving lead Chris Urmson (2015) justified their activities as part of a longer 
trend in car design: ‘for the last 130 years we’ve been working around the least 
reliable part of the car – the driver’. (When a Google car eventually made a mistake, 
deciding to pull out in front of a bus and crashing, the tone of news reporting was 
understandably gleeful). 
 For Tesla, human unreliability has become clear as they have unfolded their 
Autopilot project. Following the revelation of the fatal crash, the company’s then 
Director of Autopilot Programs tweeted: 
Human complacency is a serious but separate issue best addressed with 
education, monitoring & enforcement, not dumbed down safety systems. 
(Anderson, 2016) 
 
Soon afterwards, the company announced a set of changes to Autopilot that, if not 
‘dumbing down’, imposed substantial extra conditions on the feature. Despite 
claiming, in common with many innovators after accidents, that the crash was 
unforeseeable and exceptional, the company sought to make a repeat less likely with 
new Autopilot software uploaded to every car. Musk claimed that these updates 
would ‘minimize the possibility of people doing crazy things with it’ (quoted in 
Charton, 2015). An initial claim that ‘Autosteer now navigates highway interchanges’ 
was removed by the time of the update’s final release (Westbrook, 2016). Drivers 
were warned that they would have to touch the steering wheel more often and that, if 
they didn't demonstrate that they were paying attention, the system would shut them 
out, enforcing conventional driving for the rest of the trip. The way that the cars’ 
sensors are used was adjusted to increase the dependence of radar, which is better 
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than conventional cameras at spotting a thing like a white truck against a white sky. 
The NHTSA (2017) noted in its report that ‘Tesla has changed its driver monitoring 
strategy to promote driver attention to the driving environment’. By January 2017, the 
company was referring to Autopilot as a ‘hands-on experience’.  
 For cars built with the new hardware, Tesla activated Autopilot in January 
2017, with Musk saying ‘please be cautious’ (Musk, 2017b). The algorithms had to 
relearn how to employ the car’s new sensors, which meant a step backwards in 
performance. A class action law suit from a group of frustrated Autopilot users 
claimed that Tesla had sold them a product that failed to live up to its self-driving 
promises and was unsafe when used (Sheikh et al. v Tesla, 2017). The maximum 
speed of the new Autopilot was initially limited to 45 mph – ‘for heavy traffic, where 
it is needed most’, Musk tweeted (Musk, 2017c) – while they tested the system.  
 These changes did not satisfy the NTSB. Their final word on the probable 
cause of the Tesla crash added a concern with Autopilot’s ‘operational design, which 
permitted [the driver’s] prolonged disengagement from the driving task and his use of 
the automation in ways inconsistent with guidance and warnings from the 
manufacturer’ (NTSB, 2017c). The board considered that merely asking drivers to 
touch the steering wheel more was an inadequate response. Tesla, in the words of one 
NTSB staffer, ‘did little to constrain the use of autopilot to roadways for which it was 
designed’ (ibid.) A statement from Brown’s family, rather than blaming Tesla, 
emphasised social learning: ‘When rail systems, metro systems, and personal vehicles 
(etc.) were constructed, fatalities occurred and we learned from them … Part of 
Joshua’s legacy is that his accident drove additional improvements making the new 
technology even safer.’ (Landskroner Grieco Merriman, 2017).
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 Tesla’s public modulation of Autopilot’s capabilities represents a new mode 
of engagement with car customers. Drivers are expected to be clear about the limits of 
the technology, but these limits are continually being redefined by the company and 
tested by users, a subset of whom are engaged in a form of alternative online 
pedagogy. Some claim to have hacked the Tesla’s software or invented ways to quash 
the car’s warnings to hold the steering wheel (e.g., MEtv Product Reviews, 2016). 
YouTube is replete with hands-free Tesla driving displays and other haphazard 
experimentation (Brown and Laurier, 2017). In one much-shared case, the driver 
appears to be asleep while his Tesla moves along in traffic. While official bodies such 
as the NTSB may insist that the Tesla is not a self-driving car, a significant number of 
drivers are behaving as if they disagree. These users would seem to be at the bottom 
of the ‘certainty trough’, committed to the technology but distant enough to be 
unaware of its contingencies (MacKenzie, 1990). Musk seems to recognize the 
dangers of this false certainty, admitting that ‘Autopilot accidents are far more likely 
for expert users’ (quoted in Ramsey, 2017). 
 The connection back to the company is unclear. Tesla claims that it listens to 
drivers, such as with an update removing the speed limit at which Autopilot could be 
set. The company is keen to demonstrate that its innovation lies in its software, and 
that this allows for a new form of responsiveness. However, the model of learning is 
highly privatized. When evidence of misuse arises, the response is typically to blame 
users’ ignorance and backtrack on expectations. Tesla’s emailed response to 
Consumer Reports’ call for a moratorium on Autopilot was that, ‘[w]hile we 
appreciate well-meaning advice from any individual or group, we make our decisions 
on the basis of real-world data, not speculation by media’ (quoted in Consumer 
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Reports, 2016). This example of a company hiding behind opaque, proprietary data is 
a governance concern to which I will return in the conclusion. 
 
Technological alternatives 
Although they avoided publicly connecting the crash with their cars’ flaws, Tesla 
made a set of technological tweaks in the weeks following the announcement of the 
accident. Rather than using the ‘EyeQ’ system from Israeli company Mobileye that 
also powers other companies’ more humble safety systems, they announced a move to 
develop their own software for use with Nvidia hardware. As Tesla parted company 
with Mobileye, differences in their versions of events exposed some of the 
contingencies of machine learning in cars. Tesla didn't mention the crash, but 
Mobileye’s chairman expressed his frustration: ‘[W]e need to be there on all aspects 
of how the technology is being used, and not simply providing technology’ (quoted in 
Ramsey, 2016). The company’s head of communications added: ‘This incident 
involved a laterally crossing vehicle, which current-generation AEB [automatic 
emergency braking] systems are not designed to actuate upon’ (quoted in Fierman, 
2016), a detail that would later be highlighted by the NHTSA. 
 Nvidia have fewer qualms. Following revelations about the potential of their 
GPU chips for use in deep neural networks in the late 2000s, the company has grown 
its machine learning business. Their emphasis is on ‘end-to-end’ machine learning, in 
which the system works out the rules that need to be prioritized (detecting the edges 
of roads, for example) for the solution of its task (Bojarski et al., 2016a). This 
unsupervised, self-optimizing approach concentrates less on the rule-setting process 
of formal algorithm design and more on training data, such as from the steering wheel 
of a human driver, allowing the network to learn rules by itself (Bojarski et al., 
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2016b). This creates a hunger for new forms of input. In January 2017, Nvidia 
announced that they would be adding cameras facing inwards and well as outwards, 
to learn about drivers’ behaviour from their faces as well as their interface with the 
car’s controls.  
 Competitors have taken issue with this approach, arguing that the seemingly 
improved average performance of such systems can obscure the tiny but vital fraction 
of situations in which they fail. Mobileye’s founder described the trouble with end-to-
end learning in dealing with ‘corner cases’, the rare events that happen outside normal 
parameters but which humans may nevertheless find relatively manageable. His 
argument was that a single digital neural network that has taught itself a set of rules 
will be less able than multiple specialized subsystems with responsibilities such as 
detecting pedestrians, detecting lanes or detecting road signs, each trained with formal 
logic, ‘domain expertise’ and machine learning, to deal with the unexpected. He 
pointed out that ‘We’re talking here about a lot of work’ to get from a relatively good 
algorithm that works almost all the time to one that is trustworthy 99.9% of the time 
(Shashua, 2016). Mobileye claims that its ‘semantic abstraction’ approach requires 
more up-front effort in teaching the vocabulary of driving but fewer training examples 
(Shaley-Shwartz and Shashua, 2016). Rather than treating self-driving as a single 
problem, making it look deceptively ‘solvable’, the challenge is broken up, making 
complexities more visible. 
 Other self-driving start-ups emphasize the need for formal logic as a route to 
verification, interpretability and accountability, making it possible to know the whys 
and wherefores of algorithmic decision-making (Ackerman, 2016). All approaches 
adopted by companies make use of multiple forms of data and learning, but the 
balance varies, and depends on matters of political economy as well as engineering. 
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For the car industry, autodidactic deep learning is far more disruptive, because it 
downplays more than a century’s worth of accumulated expertise and cumulative 
learning relating to the sociotechnical system comprising cars and their material and 
social infrastructure. Deep learning instead presumes that driving is merely another 
task that can be learnt from human practitioners, mastered and improved upon. Rule-
making trumps rule-following.  
 Tesla claim that its Nvidia-powered ‘Tesla Vision’ deep neural network 
‘deconstructs the car's environment at greater levels of reliability than those 
achievable with classical vision processing techniques’ (Tesla, 2017a). Their hope is 
that this increase in brainpower will compensate for a lack of formal education.  
 As of October 2017, Tesla sees no problem with its sensors. It claims that its 
combination of GPS, radar, ultrasound and eight cameras is now capable of full 
autonomous driving. It is just waiting for its software and the regulators to catch up. 
Other driverless innovators are unconvinced that such hardware is up to the job. 
While Tesla relies on ultrasonic sensors for short distances and cameras and radar for 
detecting objects further away, other companies have invested heavily in LiDAR – a 
laser-based step-up from radar. LiDAR has a longer range than ultrasound and is 
better than radar at precisely spotting small objects made from a wide range of 
materials. But the technology is, as of 2016, prohibitively expensive and bulky for a 
private car. Competitor companies see affordable LiDAR as critical and expect its 
price to follow a downward trajectory similar to that of radar.  
 The opening up of such technological disagreements suggests that, despite the 
existence of various online explainers for ‘how self-driving cars work’, and the 
imagined gaps between engineers’ and public understandings of this, there are some 
subtle but profound differences of approach currently in play. Given these 
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contingencies, policymakers have a more active part to play in the development of 




As I have described, autonomous vehicles are not as heroically independent as their 
enthusiasts would have us believe. Nor are they as autodidactic. The story of 
autonomy is a way of downplaying a car’s connections with other vehicles, the built 
environment and the infrastructure of regulation. It is a story that deserves to be 
challenged. The emergence of self-driving cars will be a process of social learning 
that can and should be democratized. 
 Much of the noisiest excitement surrounding self-driving cars has come from a 
culture of innovation that has little experience of the material, non-digital world and is 
unused to intense regulation. Large (though still young) Silicon Valley companies 
such as Tesla and Google have been joined by start-ups like Comma.ai, a company 
that promises to ‘solve self-driving’ by offering a build-it-yourself self-driving car kit. 
Car manufacturers with long histories that have come to accommodate (and in some 
cases define) substantial government oversight have, through acquisitions and 
partnerships, sought to take advantage of these new possibilities. 
 This clash of hardware and software cultures raises immediate questions of 
governance. For example, these two worlds understand product liability very 
differently. Cars are conventionally designed, tested, and released as finished products 
with an ever-present threat of product recalls, fines or civil law suits if they are 
deemed defective. Software, however, is governed in most jurisdictions as a service 
rather than a product, and granted substantial leeway (Chander, 2014). As 
	 35	
Nissenbaum (1994) observed more than twenty years ago, we must ‘accept that the 
producers of computer systems are not, in general, fully answerable for the impacts of 
their products. If not addressed, this erosion of accountability will mean that 
computers are ‘out of control’ in an important and disturbing way.’ The norm is to 
evaluate software liability once defects are detected and consider whether innovators 
could reasonably have foreseen them. The rapid uptake of machine learning looks set 
to exacerbate the irresponsibility that Nissenbaum feared. As the stakes of software 
deployment rise – in online security, social media and robotics – we may well see 
self-driving cars as a test case for the hardening of software regulation. 
 JafariNaimi (2017) argues that the self-driving car presents an opportunity for 
reframing transport governance. With the automobile in the 20th century, a strong idea 
about what a car was – an everyday object like a bicycle rather than a sociotechnical 
system like a train and its tracks – led to regulatory regimes that concentrated power 
with cars, their drivers and manufacturers. As with other emerging technologies 
(Rayner, 2004), makers of self-driving cars see their unarguable potential being held 
back by lags and deficits – in infrastructure, law and public understanding. However, 
the technology’s promise is open-ended and its effects are impossible to reliably 
calculate. Rather than taking the technology as fixed and looking to plug the deficits 
of law or public understanding that are imagined around it, policymakers should 
instead see self-driving cars as an opportunity for more active engagement in the 
shaping of technological systems, prioritizing social learning and knitting self-driving 
cars back into their social worlds.  
 The emergence of self-driving cars, with all the missteps and misadventures 
that will occur as they mix with other modes of transport, will represent an expansion 
of what is already a form of disorganized social experimentation. Good governance 
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will mean resisting the privatization of learning that is happening. It will mean 
engaging not just with technological outcomes, which, given the complexity of 
transport systems, will be radically indeterminate, but also with the processes and 
purposes – inscribed and implicit – of innovation. 
 As I describe above, there are clear tensions between social learning and the 
pure form of machine learning manifest in deep neural networks. The opacity of 
machine learning systems, both deliberate and accidental, offers an excuse for 
innovators and a barrier for governance. However, a closer look at self-driving car 
innovation reveals some constructive alternatives. Engineers have already had to 
engage in a form of socialized machine learning, building on research in social 
robotics (e.g., de Greeff and Belpaeme, 2015). As algorithms meet the material world, 
social machine learning becomes unavoidable and engineers’ responsibilities come to 
the fore (Nourbakhsh, 2013). If engineers are able to respond, then the narrow sense 
of the ‘social’ already programmed into some cars’ neural networks – in which, for 
example, it is assumed that users are error-prone and pedestrians are just another part 
of the passive environment – need not be imposed on the world. There is some 
evidence that companies are already differentiating their approaches to self-driving 
technology (or, as some companies more modestly put it ‘driver assistance 
technology’).  
 Algorithmic efficacy has attracted substantial attention, but it will be only part 
of the innovation required to make self-driving cars work. Engineering efforts to 
improve the interpretability of deep learning systems challenge the narrative of 
inevitable opacity that has until recently provided an easy excuse for irresponsibility. 
Alongside the debate about interpretability, mitigating ‘mode confusion’ has become 
an important target for design. While some have argued that AVs should be allowed 
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to travel unlabelled, so that other road users do not take advantage of their presumed 
generosity, there is growing recognition among engineers of the need for vehicles to 
actively communicate their presence, their intentions and their capabilities to other 
road users (Surden and Williams, 2016). One AI researcher has suggested the need for 
a ‘Turing red flag law’ (Walsh, 2016), mandating the clear labelling of all 
autonomous systems.  
 The politics of novelty surrounding self-driving cars is unpredictable. 
However, if the whole system is to be as transformative as is claimed, its novelty 
should not be defined merely by technical advances in algorithms. Socializing 
machine learning demands the closer integration of insights from human-computer 
interaction and collaborative design into engineering rather than a presumption that a 
self-driving car merely means replacing a person with a computer. 
 Most corporate and regulatory statements on self-driving have overlooked the 
contingencies of machine learning to focus on human deficiencies. As well as 
blaming human error for crashes (NHTSA, 2017) policy analyses have focussed on 
the need for public education (GHSA, 2017; Policy Network 2016; Waymo 2017). 
This hubris is likely to lead to a model of accidental governance in which car 
manufacturers set the terms of experimentation, and events such as crashes come to 
define, in the minds of publics and regulators, the trajectory of technology. 
Countering this requires the deployment of what Jasanoff (2003) calls ‘technologies 
of humility’, devices for engaging with the profound uncertainties of innovation. This 
means reimagining public participation not as education, but as democracy.  
 An important entry point for governments into the process of learning and 
experimentation with self-driving cars is through the sharing of data. A self-driving 
car can already generate a gigabyte of data each second. The investigations of the 
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Tesla crash provide a window into the politics of data sharing. The NTSB were able 
to rapidly learn, from data volunteered by Tesla, what happened inside the car in the 
minutes before the crash, but Autopilot’s decision-making remained opaque. Airline 
regulators mandate the inclusion of flight data recorders (nicknamed ‘black boxes’) 
that capture conversations between pilots as well as flight data which are then shared. 
One NTSB mantra is that ‘anybody’s accident is everybody’s accident’. Some car 
companies are starting to emphasize accountability. They conclude that, in the event 
of a crash, it is important not just to know what happened but why it happened: one 
self-driving research project funded by Toyota is called ‘The car can explain’. Tesla is 
one of the few carmakers not to follow NHTSA guidance on event data recorders, 
which means that regulators must rely on the company’s generosity when crashes 
happen. The need to improve social learning has led some to call for the inclusion of 
‘ethical black boxes’ in robotic systems (Winfield and Jirotka, 2017). The reasons for 
doing so go beyond the investigation of accidents.  
 Data is the fuel for machine learning and it is a source of competitive 
advantage for car companies. It is impossible to predict precisely how data will be 
monetized, because of the wide range of possibilities of future transport systems, but 
we can anticipate that aggregated or personalized data relating to geography, driving 
behaviours, traffic, people flow and more will become an important currency for 
future innovation. The economies of scale will be substantial, tending towards new 
concentrations of economic power. 
 Once we reject the narrative of autonomy and recognize the thicket of 
connections between cars and the outside world, we can imagine new possibilities for 
machine learning in the service of social learning. If the development of self-driving 
algorithms is to realize some of the public value that its developers suggest, then there 
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is a strong case for collaboration rather than competition. If cars learn more 
effectively as fleets, then it is reasonable to expect responsible car companies to share 
their learning with others. However, if algorithms and the data that feed them are 
imagined to be, as seems likely, a source of competitive advantage, then the public 
value of self-driving technology will be diminished.  
 Some tentative governance proposals in the US have urged greater data-
sharing. Guidance from the NHTSA, launched by President Obama in September 
2016, uses the language of ‘learning’ and ‘group learning’ to justify its call for data-
sharing, particularly where urban trials are licensed by government authorities. The 
NHTSA also suggest that companies should collect and analyse data on ‘near misses 
and edge cases’, join an ‘early warning reporting program’ and find ways for their 
cars to communicate with one another (NHTSA, 2016b). The NTSB concluded its 
investigation with a similar recommendation: ‘We don't think each manufacturer of 
these vehicles need to learn the same lessons independently. We think by sharing that 
data, better learning and less errors along the way will happen’ (NTSB, 2017c).  
The initial policy focus, as with local governance measures, is on safety. The 
Californian Department of Motor Vehicles initiated a draft policy in December 2016 
demanding that companies provide data not just on accidents involving AVs, but also 
on ‘disengagements’, the moments when self-driving technology fails and demands 
human input (State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, 2016). The 
disengagement reports submitted by companies reveal the gap between informal 
experimentation and formal compliance. Tesla claims that, by the end of 2016, its 
customers had already covered more than a billion miles in Autopilot mode. 
Meanwhile, the company’s report submitted to the Californian DMV presents data on 
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its four test vehicles, which covered only 550 miles in 2016 and disengaged on 
average every three miles (Tesla, 2017b).  
 What counts as a disengagement is largely left to the companies to decide. 
But, if nothing else, such reports begin to organize social learning from self-driving 
car experimentation. As it stands, much of the NHTSA guidance is voluntary, albeit 
with a thinly veiled threat of pre-market approval and proactive regulation if car 
companies misbehave. Some companies have already sought to demonstrate their 
responsibility in data sharing in order to head off top down controls. Uber, for 
example, has volunteered aggregate data on ride sharing for the benefit of transport 
planning. Industry representatives have responded that self-driving car data will be 
commercially valuable and must therefore be proprietary, except in situations where 
safety is a priority (Hawkins, 2016).  
 Even if sufficient data is forthcoming in the event of crashes, this will be only 
a small part of a much larger process of social learning. US leadership in self-driving 
car innovation has meant the inheritance of a mode of governance in which, among 
other characteristics, cars are seen as self-evidently beneficial, risks are governed 
retrospectively (often through the courts), concerns about liberty are relatively 
elevated over those of public safety and public transport receives little support. The 
default has been to govern self-driving cars according to this framework, defining 
risks narrowly while emphasizing the need to attract investment and create new 
markets. Other countries have adopted a modulated form of this technology-first 
approach. However, there are notable examples of policies that, by starting with a 
focus on transport rather than technology, reframe the challenge. On the narrow issue 
of road safety, for example, Vision Zero, a strategy for reducing road deaths that 
began in Sweden, offers an alternative model of social learning that puts car 
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innovation alongside infrastructure, law and social norms in redistributing 
responsibility for safety (Eriksson, 2017; JafariNaimi, 2017). A social learning 
approach to governing self-driving cars would be similarly well rounded, putting the 
promise of machine learning in its place.  
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Notes
                                                1	A	good	discussion	of	the	feasibility	and	desirability	of	such	a	legal	right	can	be	found	in	Goodman	and	Flaxman	(2016),	Wachter	et	al.	(2017)	and	Edwards	and	Veale	(2017)	
2 ‘Demo 97’, for example, with a consortium of Government funders and car manufacturers, embedded 
magnets in a stretch of Interstate north of San Diego (in 1997) so that cars could follow the road’s 
twists and turns. One company claimed this was ‘an integrated vehicle control system that is helping 
move automated highways from science fiction to reality’ (quoted in Wetmore, 2003). In Europe, the 
PROMETHEUS Project (PROgraMme for a European Traffic of Highest Efficiency and 
Unprecedented Safety) brought together a large number of universities and car companies to develop 
trial systems in the late 1980s and early ‘90s. Such grand projects never got beyond the trial phase, 
however. 3	Thanks	to	Michael	Veale	for	this	point.	
	 42	
                                                                                                                                      4	Researchers	from	Carnegie	Mellon	claimed	to	have	made	a	similar	journey	in	1995,	dubbed	‘No	Hands	Across	America’,	with	their	car	driving	itself	98%	of	the	time	(Jochem	and	Pomerleau,	1996).	
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